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Abstract  
The objective of the paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the governance of the food networks focusing 
on two related aspect: the integration among the agents and the adaptation in the face of emerging disturbances. The 
paper aims at addressing the problem on what are the role of the adaptation processes in the implementation of 
sustainable strategies in Food Networks. Adaptation is a central problem of economic organisations (Williamson, 
1985, 1991), and its conceptualisation is integrated within complementary theoretical perspectives. Among them, the 
adaptation theory asks whether integration or non-integration better facilitates ‘adaptive, sequential decision making’ 
in the sense of Williamson (Gibbon, 2005, p. 205). According to Gibbons (2005) the adaptive, sequential decision-
making is modelled in terms of contracting the ex ante allocation of critical decisions rights across firms boundaries to 
the party who is expected to maximize the total surplus of the relationship. After having elaborated and presented the 
theoretical framework, the paper illustrates and discusses six cases of governance agreement. Three cases concern 
with agreement arranged at the Italian National level, three cases regard regional level Food Networks. Beyond the 
differences in the institutional environments, the cases also differ because of the degree of integration. The field 
research was carried out by documents analysis and interviews. The paper contributes to the literature by 
corroborating the theoretical hypothesis (Gibbons, 2005; Wu, 2006) and providing empirical information about the 
management of Food Networks in the face of emerging disturbances in critical fields: sustainability, quality systems 
and innovation. 
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1 Introduction 
The objective of the paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the governance of the 
food networks focusing on two related aspect (Gibbons, 2005): the integration among the agents 
and the adaptation in the face of emerging disturbances.  
Integration of supply chains is often associated with interconnected business processes within and 
outside a firm’s boundaries (Jayaram, Tan, 2010). Integration is articulated mainly in terms of 
functions, interfaces and mechanisms, such as contracts and joint decision devices (Arshinder et 
al., 2008). Vijayarasathy interpreted integration as a construct based upon the flow of goods, 
planning and control, organization and the flow of information (Vijayarasathy, 2010; van Dork and 
van der Vaart, 2005). Adaptation is a central problem of economic organisations (Williamson, 
1985, 1991), and its conceptualisation is integrated within complementary theoretical 
perspectives (Gibbons, 2005, 2010; Afuah, 2001; Arruñada et al. 2005; Gulati et al., 2005; Geyske 
et al., 2005; White, 2005; MacNeil, 1978). 
After having elaborated and presented the theoretical framework, the paper illustrates and 
discusses six cases of governance agreement. Three cases concern with agreement arranged at the 
Italian National level, three cases regard regional level Food Networks. Beyond the differences in 
the institutional environments, the cases also differ because of the degree of integration. The 
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paper contributes to the literature by corroborating the theoretical hypothesis (Gibbons, 2005; 
Wu, 2006) and providing empirical information about the management of Food Networks in the 
face of emerging disturbances in critical fields: sustainability, quality systems and innovation. 
The par2 presents the objective and the method of the study. The analytical framework and the 
hypothesis are illustrated in the par.3. The par. 4 is dedicated to the empirical analysis. Final 
remarks are presented in the last paragraph. 
 
2 Objectives and method 
The research method is based on the approach proposed by Yin (1994), according to the following 
scheme. First we developed the analytical framework drawing form literature and then identified  
theoretical propositions. We the introduce a testable conjecture on the basis of the causal 
structure proposed (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 2010). The subsequent stage consists in searching for 
answering research questions which bring to the realization of a case study. Data searching was 
realized through documents analysis and unstructured interviews1. The elaboration of theoretical 
propositions, which represents the first step, uses existing theories which are the basis of the 
empirical research (Yin, 1994).   We chose six case diverse studies (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) 
under a confirmatory perspective. Drawing from the conceptual framework, the specific questions 
addressed in the study were: 
- are critical decision rights allocated across the firms boundaries to face uncertainty? 
- what are the circumstance under which the allocation is chosen by the parties? 
In our view to answer to these question contribute to corroborate (or not) the prediction drawn 
from the literature and it may also provide guidelines for designing agreement intended to the 
governance of Agro-industry networks. 
 
3  Analytical framework 
3.1 Food supply systems integration 
The integration of supply systems is basically conceived in terms of interconnection among the 
activities of network supply units across the firm’s boundaries (Jayaram, Tan, 2010; Omta et. al., 
2001, 2002; Huggins, 2008;  Vence et al., 2000; Krug, Hendrischke, 2008;  Hawkesworth, Imrie, 
2009). Scholars underline the fact the integration channels the flow of resources and products and 
requires  exchange of information and joint planning and control (Vijayarasathy, 2010; van Dork 
and van der Vaart, 2005). The integration entails the organization of the production processes and 
supply activities under a comprehensive perspectives under which all the units involved have to 
contribute to coordinate the use of material and immaterial resources as well as the exchange 
decisions. Under this perspective the integration of a supply system is the outcome of 
organizational choices aimed at taking advantage of the specialization without loosing the gains of 
cooperation. According to the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) integration as an outcome of  
coordination decision requires choosing adequate governance structures (Williamson, 1985). 
Provided that the parties to a transaction align the characteristics of the governance structures 
(market, hybrid, hierarchy) to the transaction attributes (asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency) 
(Williamson, 1985), one question thus regards what governance structures are (or should be) 
chosen to integration purposes. Williamson (1991, 2005) states that as the asset specificity 
                                                 
1 One the authors has been also involved in the setting up of the agreement reported in the study. 
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increases, the agents are induced to adopt more tightly coordinated forms of governance.  
Furthermore, integration is based upon patterns of cooperation and coordination among the 
partners, patterns which are embodied by the governance structure in the parties relationships 
with a specific role for the opportunities of managing the emerging of ex post disturbances. This 
reflects circumstances of mutual interdependence associated to the necessity of maintaining legal 
autonomies of the parties:  scholars have shown how, in such circumstances,  complex 
institutional arrangements are established by agents, also entailing private and public orderings 
connections (Mènard, 2006; Gonzàlez-Diaz et al. 2003; Martinez et al., 2007).  Gibbons (2005) 
argued that an adaptation theory asks whether integration or non-integration better facilitates 
‘adaptive, sequential decision making’ in the sense of Williamson (Gibbon, 2005: 205). Notably, 
the adaptation theory applies not only to make-or-buy problem, but also to a particular class of 
contracting problems, where two firms pass decisions rights across their boundaries by contract 
(Gibbons, 2005: 234). Under this view the integration is strictly associated with the adaptation 
processes of the governance structures adopted by the agents. In the following we summarize this 
theoretical perspective.  
3.2 Adaptation 
Adaptation is a central problem of economic organisations (Williamson, 1985, 1991), and its 
conceptualisation is integrated within complementary theoretical perspectives. Williamson (2005) 
focuses on the comparative efficiency with which alternative modes of governance affect good 
order during the ex-post contract implementation interval. Adaptation is based on workable, 
order-preserving mechanisms for adapting to disturbances in services yielding mutual gains and 
for adjusting to the capacity of the parties of a long-term contract to incorporate hazard-
mitigating mechanisms within the ex-ante contractual agreement (Williamson, 2003, 2005). Gulati 
et al. (2005) conceptualise adaptation in the vertical relationship in terms of differentiation, 
concerning the state of collaboration among the units, and integration, regarding the state of the 
segmentation of the organisational systems into subsystems. Ménard (2004, 2006) states that  
hybrids aim to reduce the costs of contract specification and of the associated rigidities, by 
designing a general, relational, contractual framework.  
Gibbons (2005) subsumes the theme of adaptation in a complex theoretical structure by framing 
four elemental theories of the firm. Among them, the adaptation theory asks whether integration 
or non-integration better facilitates ‘adaptive, sequential decision making’ in the sense of 
Williamson (Gibbon, 2005, p. 205). Notably, the adaptation theory applies not only to make-or-buy 
problem, but also to a particular class of contracting problems, where two firms pass decisions 
rights across their boundaries by contract (Gibbons, 2005, p. 234).  A key idea is that integration 
decision facilitate the parties relationship (Gibbons, 2005, p. 2009). Namely, Gibbons (2005, p. 
235) assumes that an asset consists of three components: a vector of extricable decision rights d 
(which can be moved by contract, without changing the ownership of the asset); a vector of 
inextricable decisions rights δ (which are controlled by the owner) and an inextricable payoff π 
(received by the owner). While decisions are not contractible ex post, the decision rights can be 
contracted ex ante (Gibbons, 2005, p. 213).  The parties negotiate ex ante the allocation of the 
critical decision rights to the party who is expected to maximize the total surplus: 
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(1)   TSi ≡   Es {U1(s, di (s)) + U2 (s, di (s))} 
 
where: 
 
TSi = total surplus, when the critical decision rights have been allocated to the party i=1, 2; 
di = critical decisions allocated to the party i = 1, 2; 
s = uncertain events observable ex post; 
U1 = utility function of the party i = 1, 2. 
  
Namely, following Gibbons (2005) let us indicate:  
 
aC contractible ex ante decisions 
λN inalienable ex post  decisions that are contractible ex ante 
dN ex post decisions that are not contractible ex post 
σ0 observable signals 
 
then, the adaptation theory as a model of ex post governance is structured in a formal integrative 
framework articulating the following timing (Gibbons, 2005: 230-231): 
 
I. the governance structure is negotiated contracting on the ex ante actions aC with the allocation 
of decision rights to the take the ex post decisions dN  that are not contractible ex post. 
II. Ex ante  actions chosen aC. 
III. Interim signals observed σ=σ0 
IV. Ex post decision taken d= (λN, dN) 
V. Pay-off  U (a, σ, d) received 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Adaptation theory - Timing 
 
 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
Governance structure 
negotiation, with 
allocation of decision 
rights  to the take the 
ex post decisions dN 
Ex ante action 
chosen aC 
Interim signals 
observed σ0 
Ex post 
decision taken 
d= (λN, dN) 
  
Pay-off  U (a, 
σ, d) received  
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Therefore the adaptive, sequential decision-making is modelled in terms of contracting the ex ante 
allocation to one party of critical decisions rights (selected from the vector d) (stage I) who will 
take the decision (stage IV), having observed the state of the nature (stage III) unforeseeable at 
the time of the choice of the governance structure (stage I). The ex ante allocation of the decision 
rights to one party is thus the means the parties adopt to undertake the ex post adaptation to 
disturbances (Wu, 2006).  
On the basis of the adaptation theory we introduce then the following conjecture: 
 
H1: In the face of the uncertainty, the parties to a transaction in Agro-industry chains will integrate 
their activities by allocating critical decision rights to the party who is expected to maximize the 
total surplus 
 
We test this hypothesis by through the evidence of the empirical analysis. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 The producers-processors contractual framework in the North Italian Sugar Network 
The sugar beet producers established national level Producers Associations (Associazione 
Nazionale Bieticoltori-ABI, Consorzio Bieticoltori Italiani-CBI, Associazione Bieticoltori Italiani-ABI) 
according to European law.  The main objective of these association is to concentrate and trade 
the sugar beet produced channelling it toward the processing stage. The table 1 summarize the 
recent evolution of the total Italian supply of sugar beet.  
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Table 1.  
Production of Sugar Beet in Italy by geographical area 
    
                
        
Year    North Center South  Italy 
                
        
2000 UAA Ha  154547 52457 42146 249150 
 Production tons  8319477 1640172 1609532 11569181 
2001 UAA Ha  135790 49906 36897 222593 
 Production tons  7114253 1409045 1386513 9909811 
2002 UAA Ha  162213 46406 37097 245716 
 Production tons  8980235 2266264 1481291 12727790 
2003 UAA Ha  133641 41473 39056 214170 
 Production tons  4994150 938007 1204341 7136498 
2004 UAA Ha  118748 34777 32278 185803 
 Production tons  6103182 1088839 1281002 8473023 
2005 UAA Ha  169286.12 46900.18 36856.98 253043.28 
 Production tons  10552674.16 2122229.335 1480779.485 14155682.98 
2006 UAA Ha  58.179.078 14.194.510 19.729.890 92.103.478 
 Production tons  3.453.190.112 670.466.700 705.688.717 4.829.345.529 
2007 UAA Ha  60.207.160 12.347.410 13.083.680 85.638.250 
 Production tons  3.556.163.039 482.365.592 591.364.338 4.629.892.969 
2008 UAA Ha  48.929.240 2.298.380 9.943.990 61.171.610 
 Production tons  3.008.361.416 100.816.187 411.677.760 3.520.855.363 
                
Source: Authors elaboration  from 
ABI       
A general contractual agreement has been signed in 2011 between the Sugar Beet Producers 
Associations and the Co.Pro.B. a cooperative company engaged in the processing stage.  
Co.Pro.B.- Cooperativa Produttori Bieticoli s.c.a is the only Italian sugar producer having the form 
of a cooperative society. 
Its mission is to process beetroot, mostly granted by the member farms, in two sugar production 
plants and to sell sugar by its own network for selling Italian sugar.  
The Cooperative has 4.357 member farms, mostly located in Emilia Romagna and Veneto, which 
has some of the most suitable soil for beetroot cultivation.  
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The agreement concerns with sugar beet produced in North and Central Italy and can thus thought 
of having a national level nature. The agreement is designed in order to rule the processing of 
sugar beet and energy from the pulps. The Co.Pro.B. invested 100 millions of Euro in 2001 in order 
to enlarge the scale of the processing stage. The agreement require the Sugar Beet Producers 
Association to invest 35 millions of Euro in order to built on seven biodigesters dedicated to the 
production of bioenergy processing the pulps obtained from the sugar production. The economic 
(and organizational) sense of agreement relates to the complex evolution of the regulation of the 
sugar beet European market. Actually the sugar beet market and the activities of the agricultural 
production and processing stages are included within a National Plan of intervention issued by the 
Italian Ministry of Agricultural Policies. Nevertheless, the timing of the plan is held to be not 
adequately scheduled with respect to the emerging necessities of the sector.  
On the behalf of the associated producers, the Producers Associations have the decision right of 
designing and signing  specific agreements and contracts with energy suppliers delivering the bio-
energy produced by the biodigesters. Accordingly, the general agreement gives to the agricultural 
producers the right to withdraw a fixed amount of pulp. The amount is equal to 13.50% of the 
sugar beet production delivered to the processing plant. The input-output flows generated by the 
general agreement is illustrated in the figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sugar Chain general agreement – Input-Output flows 
Source: the Authors 
 
The contractual agreement thus allocates a critical decision rights to the Producers Associations. 
This choice is motivated by the fact that at the contractual agreement outset an environmental 
uncertainty existed due to demand for energy which may be faced by the producers and to the 
management of the completion of the building on the biodigesters. These two sources of 
uncertainty can be better faced by the Producers Associations both because their ability in 
managing the relationships with the agricultural producers and their ability in completing the 
investments. 
According to the Gibbons theory the critical aspects of the contractual agreement can be framed 
by through the following timing: 
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Figure 3. Sugar Chain general agreement – Timing of adaptation  
Source: the Authors 
 
4.2 The producers-processors contractual framework in the North-Italy Tomato Chain 
The of the general contractual agreement for the tomato production does not offer specific 
elements supporting the theoretical hypothesis here considered. 
We examined the Contract signed in 2010 by the Unaproa – a general association of Producers 
Associations – and the Associazione Italiana Industrie Prodotti Alimentari. The general agreement  
designs the contractual framework which provides the basic elements of the specific contract 
which will be signed by a Producers associations and the processors. This contributes to considers 
the Unaproa as a hybrid governance structure (Martino, Pampanini, 2006).   The general objective 
of the agreements is to design the guidelines for planning the production by through coordinating 
the activities of the agricultural and processing stages. The agreement if furthermore intended to 
promote the marketing of the product and the enhancement of the quality. The basic activities are 
expected to be carried out under a joint management of the both agricultural and industry party: 
 
- production planning; 
- information disclosing; 
- public monitoring supporting activities; 
- marketing planning; 
- quality improvement design and implementation; 
- implementing of the traceability system. 
 
The Unaproa has the decision rights of designing the services systems, namely the traceability 
system. This is the basis of crucial organizational innovation, nonetheless this right is not taken for 
granted in the general agreement or at least it is not explicitly allocated. We submit that all the 
critical uncertain elements are expected to be jointly managed by the parties. At the same time, 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
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the environmental uncertainty at stake concerns mainly the contingent fluctuations of the final 
demand. On the other hand the governance of the Tomato chain is made more complex  by a 
further level of general agreement the Tomato District, an association among several economic 
and policy agents established since 2007, in order to design and to carry out activities concerning: 
quality, innovation and efficiency. 
4.3 The producers-processors contractual framework in the North-Italy Potato Chain 
The Italian Union of Potatoes Producers’ Associations (Unione nazionale tra le associazioni dei 
produttori di patate, UNAPA), located in Rome, reunites 12 Associations and is officially recognised 
by the Italian Ministry for Agricultural Policies.  
UNAPA aims to represent, protect, assist and coordinate the associated organizations active in the 
potato processing industry, according to the  rules of the Common Market Organization. It 
enhances supply concentration and increase its value added, frame-contracts for the associated 
organizations. It promotes development of seed potatoes production, protection and value added 
for production and marketing of potatoes for fresh consumption and industrial use, helping to 
strengthen trade relations in the food supply chain.  
We take in consideration the 2008 general agreement signed by the UNAPA and three association 
of processing companies. The agreement is aimed at: 
 
- providing the frame for designing individual contracts between agricultural producers 
associations and processors; 
- promoting the experimenting of new forms of integration in order to face the competition 
in North Italy 
- regulating the mechanism of prices formation for the agricultural prices. 
The general agreement includes specific formulas to determine the agricultural prices and also 
establishes qualitative standards. 
Notably the contract allocates decision rights to the parties: 
- the individual parties (e.g. a given agricultural producers association and a processor) have 
the right to negotiate betters terms; 
- both the farmers and the processors have the rights to choice the best technology they 
prefer (provide the quality constraint and objectives). 
-  
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Figure 4: Potato Chain general agreement – Timing of adaptation 
Source: the Authors 
 
4.4 The “Pollo d’erba” system 
The “Pollo d’Erba” case study considered  relates the project of integration of agents involved in 
the supply of organic poultry meat (Pampanini et al., 2009). This is a niche product obtained by 
traditional poultry genotypes with qualitative characteristics very different from the conventional 
poultry meat. The production system is based on a few simple rules entailing natural feeding and 
housing and a very low density (n. of head/m2). As a consequence the cost of production is larger 
than in the case of the conventional product and difficulties arise in efficiently organizing the 
supply system. This is also due to concentration of the poultry market. In this context the 
integration project was intended to establish a close coordination among the parties in order to 
structure their relationship and increase the possibilities of selling the product on selected market 
segments. 
The integration project included the following main investments: a) Physical assets, at farms 
(Euro 255.500), intended to diffuse the poultry strains and to implement production protocol;  b) 
Elaboration and implementation of certification systems and of the set of technical and 
organizational rules needed to introduce the commercial brand “Pollo d’Erba” (Euro 283.280). 
 The total number of parties involved were: a) four agricultural farms; b) one agricultural 
cooperative; c) a national level Association of Organic Producers (Aiab); d) a regional Technological 
park. The productive and institutional relationships are illustrated in the figure 2 (the solid lines 
indicate the flow of product, while the dot lines indicate the institutional relationship). 
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Figure 5. Case Pollo d’erba  - Institutional and productive relationships (Pampanini et al., 2009) 
 
The five growers act as producer. They are in charge to make the investment identified by the 
general agreement signed by the parties under the supervision of the Regional Government of 
Umbria- However the producers have the right to choice the technology of the investment: i.e. the 
type of resources to be chosen and combined as well as the ways of using them in the context of 
the production plans agreed. The basic reasons for allocating this right to the producers is directly 
motivated by the Gibbons adaptation theory. The investments at stake will be directly managed by 
the growers within the organizational framework of their own farms. Therefore the growers 
experience and technological knowledge play a crucial role in ensuring the possibility of achieving 
the value added of the investments. Tyre and von Hippel (1997) make clear as individuals 
elaborate on their relations with physical assets in productive activities and give raise to complex 
processes of information exchange and elaboration as steps of human capital formation at the 
production process level. Accordingly, the growers directly management of the new investments 
allow them to contribute to maximize the expected total surplus of the relationship in the sense of 
Gibbons. Furthermore, the experience of the growers allows them to take the right decision about 
the technology of the investment to be made, thus providing a further contribute to the 
maximization of the surplus.  
The general agreement allocate also to the producers the decision rights about the production 
plans. The number of the growers and the scale of the slaughterhouse plant are fixed, therefore 
the supply may vary just because of the rate of exploiting of the scale of the plant (see below) or 
because the variation of the output supplied by the growers. On the other hand, the growers can 
just use the resources they own or control to the purpose of the agreement, therefore to allocate 
to them the right to plan the production avoid to underutilize or stress the resources available and 
then allow the parties to contribute to maximize the surplus. 
The third decision right allocated to the growers concerns the their sales. The growers can sell 
their own product to buyer not included in the agreement up the 49% of their total product. This 
gives to the producers a very large number of degree of freedom.    
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As for the Processor (the slaughterhouse company) - beyond the rights corresponding to the duties 
of the remaining parties (e.g. the right to process at least the 51% of the growers output) - the 
agreement explicitly mention only the assignment of duties (to slaughter, to channel to the market 
the output within the PDO umbrella, to pay to the grower a variable part of the price over the 
fixed payment agreed). It is a controversial point, as the agreement, for example, say nothing 
about the possibility for the processor to elaborate productive and trading strategies which will 
not threat the strategies supported by the agreement. In other words, the processor has the right 
to elaborate also strategies which may compete with the strategies agreed, but this right is nether 
recognized nor banned by the agreement in itself. However the task of elaborating marketing 
strategies includes the decision rights concerning several aspects of the practical activities which 
are influential on the whole performance of the agreement. The allocation of these rights can be 
predicted by the Gibbons theory: the processor is actually directly in touch with the distribution 
agents (see figure 2) and then she can better elaborate the marketing strategies. 
The Technological Park 3A acts a provider of services and has the right to design product and 
process innovation  and to provide them to the parties. The Park has also the right to provide 
specific marketing services which should be used by the parties in the context of the marketing 
strategies of the Processor. Also the rights allocated to the Park can be easily predicted by the 
Gibbons theory because of the specialization of the Park in both technological research and 
services provision.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Pollo d’erba  general agreement – Timing of adaptation  
Source: the Authors 
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4.5 The producers-processors contractual framework of the Molini Popolari di Umbertide 
(Umbria) and of the Il Biroccio (Marche) 
In this paragreaph we present two cases concerning the cereals sector in two regions of Central 
Italy: Umbria (Molini Popolari di Umbertide) and Marche (Il Biroccio). The Molini Popolari di 
Umbertide designed a specific integration contract with 15 farms in the context of the 2007-2013 
Rural Development Plan (RDP) of Regione Umbria. Molini Popolari Riuniti, located in Umbertide 
(Perugia, Umbria) is a cooperative society that has grains storage and milling as its core business, 
but is also active in cattle and pigs breeding, extravirgin oil production, bread-making and feed 
production. The grains milling activity serves two chains:  feed production and bread-making.  
The agreement is aimed at better coordinate the activities of the farms and the cooperative 
enhancing their relationship in the face of the challenges posited by the competition. The 
agreement covers the 9% of the regional cereals production and involves  more than 3670 farms. 
The parties agreed on jointly carrying out the following activities: 
 
- to choose the genotypes; 
- to plan the production and to coordinate the agricultural supply with the processing stage; 
- to design individual crop contracts; 
- to optimize the logistic activities; 
- to disclose information among the partners; 
- to define standard and to comply. 
 
Notably the agreement also allocate to the parties the decision rights about the investment to be 
made with the support of the RDP. Actually the parties agreed on investing 24,6millions of Euros 
both in the agricultural and in the processing stage. Nonetheless, the agreement describe exactly 
the investment which each party decided to do, according to her technological preferences and to 
the resources already managed.  
The Cooperative “Il Biroccio”, located in Filottrano (Ancona, Marche), processes and sells 
agricultural products of its own production or granted by its members. It manages two sales areas 
and sells its own products in mass-retailing stores. It also provides supplies for farming (to 
member farmers only) and manages its own land. 483 farms are members of the cooperative; they 
are located mostly in Filottrano and neighbouring towns.  
In the context of the RDP of the Regione Marche, the Cooperative “Il Biroccio” promoted the 
supply chain agreement known as “Futuro cereali delle Marche”. The objectives of the agreement 
are: 
- to improve the competitiveness of the farms; 
- to enhance efficiency; 
- to transfer technology; 
- to experiment cropping technology; 
- to increase the agricultural value added. 
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The activities aimed at achieving these objectives are the following: 
- to provide extension services; 
- to make investments both in the agricultural and the processing stage; 
- to design new productive patterns 
- to certificate the products 
As in the case of the Molini Popolari di Umbertide, the general agreement allocate to the parties 
expected to maximize the total surplus the decision right on making investments. 
The figure 7 summarize the adaptation timing identified for both the cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The Molini Popolari and Il Biroccio general agreements – Timing of adaptation  
Source: the Authors 
 
4.6 A synthesis  
The case study provides a basic confirmation of the theoretical prediction concerning the 
allocation of  critical decision rights across the firms boundaries. The Table 2 summarizes the 
decision rights allocated and associates them to the sources if uncertainty identified. 
 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
Governance structure 
negotiation, with allocation 
of decision rights  to the 
take the ex post decisions 
dN 
 
Producers:  
- to decide the 
investments 
 
 
Processor 
 
- to decide the 
investments 
 
Ex ante action chosen 
aC 
  
Ordinary production 
and marketing 
acitivites 
Interim signals 
observed σ0 
- technology 
available 
- consumers 
expectations 
- funding  
Ex post decision 
taken d= (λN, dN): 
 
 
Producers:  
 
-Investment made 
 
 
-Production plans 
 
 
Processor 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pay-off  U (a, 
σ, d) received  
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Table 2.  
Decision rights and sources of uncertainty 
 
CASES 
 
SOURCES OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
DECISION RIGHTS ALLOCATED 
Size and 
type of 
invstements 
Production 
plans 
Market 
plan 
Individual 
negotiation 
Freedom of 
trade 
North Italian 
Sugar Chain 
Technology, Quality  
X 
 
X 
   
North-Italy 
Tomato 
Chain 
 
Technology, Quality  
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
North-Italy 
Potato Chain 
Technology, Quality, 
Market 
  none 
Pollo d’Erba 
system 
Technology, Quality, 
Environmental 
sutainability 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
Molini 
Popolari di 
Umbertide  
 
Technology, Quality,  
 
X 
 
 
X 
   
 
Il Biroccio 
 
Technology, Quality, 
 
X 
 
 
X 
   
Source: the Authors 
Therefore we submit that the findings corroborate our conjecture. The sources of uncertainty deal 
with the environmental uncertainty and mainly concerns with technology and quality or 
compliance with standards defined in the general contractual framework. The case of the  North-
Italy Potato Chain provides a disconfirming evidence which here is interpreted in terms of the 
various level of contracting. Beyond the differences in the institutional environments, the cases 
also differ because of the degree of integration. The expectations on the ex post uncertainty 
solution is often explicitly taking into consideration by the parties. 
 
5 Final remarks 
The study concerns the integration of the activities in agro-industry chains. The analytical 
framework motivates the conjecture that the allocation of decision rights is central to the 
negotiation of organizational arrangement along the chains investigated. The empirical analysis 
shows that, among other, the negotiation concentrates of the allocation of decision rights relating 
to uncertain circumstance. Innovation issues, quality (and safety) objectives and consumers 
behaviours seems the main circumstances requiring the allocation of critical decision rights. 
Therefore the ex ante allocation of decision rights is critical to the economic and environmental 
sustainable strategies. The study of the environmental uncertainty appear to be critical to the 
design of modes of integration in agro-industry chain and therefore to their expected 
performance. 
 
Gaetano Martino and Angelo Frascarelli 
573 
References 
Afuah, A. (2001). Dynamics boundaries of the firm: Are firm better off being vertically integrated in the face 
of a technological change. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 1211-1228. 
Arruñada, B., Garicano, L., and Vàzquez, L. (2005). Completing contracts ex-post: How car manufacturers 
manage car dealers. Review of Law and Economics, 1: 149-173. 
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., and Murphy, K. J. (2002). Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 39-83. 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4: 386-405. 
Dahlstrom, R., Nygaard, A. (2010). Epilogue: Popperian perspectives on transaction cost economics and 
future directions of empirical research. Journal of Retailing, 86: 284-290. 
David, R., Han, S. K. (2004). A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost 
economics. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 39-58. 
Geysken, I., Steenkamp, J. B. E. M., and Kumar, N. (2006). Make, buy or ally: A transaction cost theory meta-
analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 519-543. 
Gibbons, R. (2005). Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
58: 200-245. 
Gibbons, R. (2010). Transaction Cost Economics: Past, Present and Future?, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 112: 263-288. 
Gulati, R., Lawrence, P., and Puranam, P. (2005). Adaptation in vertical relationships: Beyond incentive 
conflict. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 415-440. 
MacNeil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical 
and relational contract law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72: 854-905. 
Martino, G., Pampanini, R. (2006). - Natura economica delle organizzazioni dei produttori agricoli: 
un’interpretazione alla luce della teoria neoistituzionale, Economia e Diritto Agroalimentare, n. 1-2  
Martino, G., Pampanini, R. (2009). Integration Policy in Agri-Food Chains: Theory and Empirical Evidences, 
Paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks, 
September 3-5, 2009,  School of Economics and Business, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo 
Martino, G. (2010). Trust, Contracting and Adaptation in Agri-Food Hybrid Structures, International Journal 
on Food System Dynamics, 3 
Fritz, M., Martino, G.,and  Surci, G. (2008). Trust conditional on governance structure: theory and evidence 
from case studies, Journal on Chain and Network Science, vol. 8, n.1 
White, S. (20059. Cooperation costs, governance choice and alliance evolution. Journal of Management 
Studies, 42: 1383-1412. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. London, U.K.: The Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 259-296. 
Williamson, O. E. (1995). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. In O. E. 
Williamson, & S. E. Masten (Eds.), Transaction cost economics -Theory and concepts- (Vol. 1): 96-124. 
Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (2005). The economics of governance. American Economic Review, 95: 1-18. 
Wu, S. Y. (2006). Contract Theory and Agricultural Policy Analysis: A discussion and survey of recent 
developments. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 50: 490-509  
